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*I.E.L.R. 282 I. Introduction
States with oil and gas resources develop mechanisms for enjoying their natural resources. The
well-known mechanisms are usually licences, production sharing agreements (PSAs) and service
contracts. Some states may either use one of such mechanisms exclusively;1 or deploy them as
hybrids or alternatives.2
The first part of this article defines licences and PSAs, and the rationale for employing each of these
mechanisms. The second part of this article deals with what appear to be material reasons why states
prefer using licences or PSAs exclusively, or deploying both of them as alternatives. The third part of
this article contains the conclusion.
Although various states each have individual special features in using licences or PSAs (which is
beyond the scope of this work), this article briefly attempts to reflect an underlying consistency in
identifying the material reasons why most states prefer using licences or PSAs exclusively, or
deploying both devices as alternatives.
It should also be kept in mind that the state is always faced with the dilemma of ensuring it generates
as much revenue as it can from its oil and gas resources; but ensuring that investors are not chased
away by the mechanisms it deploys to enjoy its oil and gas resources—which makes the choice
between a licence or PSA very material.
Furthermore, states which use licences and PSAs as alternatives create more room for investment,
competition and absorption of large, medium and small scale industries.3 It also gives room for the
investor to choose between a licence and PSA.4
In this article, the writer holds the view that although licences and PSAs share and achieve the same
purpose5 of generating revenue for states; there appear to be material reasons why most states
prefer using licences or PSAs exclusively, or deploy both devices as alternatives.
II. Definition and rationale for using licences or PSAs
A licence is a permit granted by the state to an investor to explore, develop and produce oil and gas
at its own risk and cost for a specified period of time. In return, the investor pays taxes or royalties to
the state.6
Licences are usually utilised in provinces which are relatively depleted.7 From the perspective of the
state, it is concerned with ensuring that trusted investors with relevant financial and technical
expertise use its depleted petroleum resources for the best use of the state concerned.8 Thus,
licences are usually granted after a tender or bidding process.
A PSA is a contract9 between a state10 and an investor, in which the investor at his own cost and risk
agrees to explore, develop and produce petroleum resources for the state for a specified period of
time. In return, the state rewards the investor with a share of the petroleum resources. The investor is
usually first given "cost oil" to cater for the cost of the petroleum exploration; and later, *I.E.L.R. 283
"compensation oil" (or "production or profit oil") to cater for petroleum production, which the investor
sells at the international market.11
PSAs are usually deployed in states where the field is new or just discovered, relatively unexplored,
undeveloped or has less appealing prospects.12 The state uses PSA as an attractive mechanism to
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get an oil company with technical, material infrastructure, labour and capital to explore and develop its
oil and gas resources.
From the above it can be inferred that states utilising PSAs or licences are all concerned with
ensuring the investor has the relevant expertise in a bid to generate revenue for the state.13
However, an important difference14 may be spotted from the definition of a licence and PSA. In PSAs,
the state generates its revenue by placing premium on sharing the oil and gas production with the
investor;15 while in licences, the state usually places a very high premium on taxation or royalties.16
Other material differences are discussed hereunder.
i. Developing versus developed countries
It has been observed, that most developing countries are inclined to use PSAs, while most developed
countries prefer licences.17
First, developing countries, with a sad history of colonialism are quick to make a statement on the
sovereignty over its natural resources and are unwilling to grant an investor ownership over such
resource.18 In the same vein, it is another way the state tells its citizens that its petroleum resources
are being used for its benefit.19
Secondly, developing countries usually do not have the technological and financial capability to
embark on exploration of its natural resources and needs the assistance of an investor that has such
capabilities.
From the perspective of most developed countries, they are usually concerned with ensuring that their
depleted petroleum province are best utilised by trusted investors. Secondly, most developed
countries are usually more concerned with (among others) efficient tax and auditing
systems—licences are proven to play a better role here.20
ii. Flexibility
PSAs appear to create more room for flexibility than licences. PSAs appear to be more participatory
than licences, which are based on resource ownership.21 Secondly, the investor is given more room to
go about his exploration of natural resources and the rules on the bidding process, taxation, imports,
exports, requirement as to the use of land and type of labour used may be relaxed.22 Thirdly, there is
room for negotiation by the investor and the state regarding the terms of the contract.23 Fourthly, the
investor is in a better position to use his petroleum field as securitisation, e.g for a bank loan or
mortgage.24 Lastly, the investor is allowed to book reserves represented by share of its oil on its
balance sheet.25
On the other hand, licences appear to give the investor an option of "take it or leave it".26 The investor
usually has to be granted a licence after a successful bidding process.27 Secondly, the rules on
taxation, use of labour, and the terms of using the oil field appear to be strict.28 Thirdly, the investor is
in little or no position to use his petroleum field for securitisation.29 This may scare the investor.
iii. Duration of exploration
PSAs appear to give longer duration (than licences do) for exploration and exploitation of oil and gas
resources.30 From the perspective of most states using PSAs, it is an attractive means to get the
investor into its domain, with *I.E.L.R. 284 lucrative prospects of the investor having a long term to
enjoy its investment.31 From the perspective of most states using licences, they give the investor a
relatively short period of time to see if the investor is able to utilise its near depleted petroleum field to
best use.32 If the state considers the investor is unable utilise the petroleum field within that relatively
short period of time, the investor will likely lose its license to the petroleum field.
iv. Local content
Most states in theory utilise PSAs as a vehicle to create jobs for its indigenes.33 Thus, investors are
mandated to utilise local infrastructure and human capital within the state and to transfer technology
to local professionals.34 On the other hand, most states that utilise licences in theory appear to make
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a statement of non-discrimination among investors in utilising infrastructure and human capital.35
v. Regulation
Sates utilise licences as a better mechanism to enforce regulatory and administrative measures on
the investor while exploiting its natural resources.36 Thus, states that utilise licences are known to
develop stringent measures to ensure the oil company does not violate (among others) tax and
auditing requirements.37 The danger is that the state may scare investors who may find the regulatory
measures developed by the state’s authorities to be conflicting38 or find the standard too high to
comply with.39
However, states usually deploy PSAs as an alternative mechanism to relax strict rules (among others)
on the bidding process, tax, auditing requirements, import, exports and labour requirements in order
to attract investors to its undeveloped oil and gas field.40
vi. Investment risk
Although, in both PSAs and licences, the investor embarks at his own cost and risk, there appear to
be certain differences that apply to both of them.
First, most states that use PSA (unlike licences41) does not confer ownership title on the investor. The
danger is that if the state acquires the developed petroleum field(s) from an investor, all its assets on
the field reverts to the state thereby depriving the investor of its legitimate expectation.42 Thus,
investors should be wary of investing in the state if they do not have sufficient legal protection in the
form of a stabilisation and renegotiation clause.43
Secondly, PSAs in theory44 appear to create legal protection for the investor in the form of a
stabilisation or renegotiation clause in order to create commercial certainty and security for the
investor concerned.45 Most states that use licences in theory do not usually have stabilisation clauses
and thus if the state changes any of its laws or regulation, the investor may be in a precarious
position.46
vii. Competition
States that utilise licences appear to create more room for competition among investors than states
that utilise PSAs. First, a bidding or tender process is usually a requirement in awarding a licence in
order to ensure the most trusted investors with technical and financial expertise are awarded the
almost depleted petroleum field to explore.47 States that use PSAs are more inclined to relax the rules
on the bidding process since the petroleum field is relatively new or undeveloped.48
Similarly, unlike in PSAs, the short and prescribed time table given to investors in licensing regimes to
explore, develop and produce oil and gas, creates competition among investors to perform effectively
or risk losing their acreage. *I.E.L.R. 285 49
III. Conclusion
This article takes the position that although states utilise both licences and PSAs to achieve the same
purpose of generating revenue from the oil and gas resources of the state concerned; there appear to
be material reasons why most states prefer utilising licences or PSAs as alternatives, or utilise one of
them exclusively.
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